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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitrage.  The words that come to mind when attempting to define 
“arbitrage” inevitably include terms such as lies, trickery, unfair play, 
and deception.  Intuition calls us to correct the system and level the 
playing field to eliminate whatever mechanism allows such arbitrageurs 
their ability to exploit a loophole in the system.  Unfortunately, when a 
party reaps the benefits of system inefficiencies, surrounding 
organizations bear the burden of an unfair economic advantage.  The 
mechanism enabling such arbitrage requires correction not only to 
restore marketplace balance but also to remedy the negative impact 
inflicted on related corporations. 
A particular form of arbitrage is growing in Delaware appraisal 
litigation as hedge funds and activist shareholders exploit the leniency of 
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) section 262.  When a 
corporation decides to acquire or merge with another corporation, section 
262 provides shareholders that dissent or abstain from a merger 
“appraisal rights” granting shareholders the ability to challenge the 
impending merger price through an appraisal action.1  In the past decade, 
the Delaware court system has seen a tremendous growth from 
shareholders fixated on bringing appraisal claims.  However, these 
claims are not being brought by the dissenting minority shareholders that 
section 262 was designed to protect.  The surge of new plaintiffs has 
primarily been hedge funds and activist shareholders attempting to take 
advantage of an unjust investment strategy that is now commonly 
referred to as “appraisal arbitrage.” 
Appraisal arbitrage occurs when hedge funds and activist 
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shareholders take advantage of statutory appraisal rights by acquiring a 
sizeable amount of shares shortly after a merger is announced with the 
intention of asserting appraisal rights in the future.2  These arbitrageurs 
seek to “buy” appraisal claims and prey on merger transactions as they 
deem fit.  Such appraisal actions are being brought by very sophisticated 
entities that have specialized in an investment strategy aimed at taking 
advantage of minority shareholder appraisal rights.3  Overall, such 
actions exploit a statutory right intended to protect and provide a remedy 
for minority shareholders that have been taken advantage of by abusive 
mergers. 
By providing concentrated legislative reforms to section 262, the 
amount of appraisal arbitrage being performed by hedge funds and 
activist shareholders can be controlled and limited substantially.  The 
first step to solving this pressing issue requires the Delaware legislature 
to amend section 262 to prohibit the purchase of a merging corporation’s 
shares after the record date (or the date that determines shareholder 
eligibility to vote in a pending merger), effectively preempting the ruling 
of In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies Inc.4  This Comment will 
show that the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Transkaryotic 
increases the lucrative nature of an appraisal action by allowing hedge 
funds and activist shareholders the opportunity to survey market 
conditions before buying a company’s stock.  Targeted reforms that 
eliminate a hedge fund’s knowledge of market conditions up to the 
effective date of the merger will substantially increase the risks of 
appraisal arbitrage.5  The suggested reforms in Part III of this Comment 
stand to decrease the amount of appraisal actions brought by hedge funds 
and activist shareholders, while continuing to protect the long-term 
minority shareholders the statute was designed to encompass. 
The second reform requires the Delaware legislature to eliminate, or 
at least substantially reduce, the statutory interest rate provided in section 
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262(h) as a further step to the pending reforms.6  Section 262(h) provides 
that dissenting shareholders will be awarded statutory interest that 
accrues at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate for the duration of 
their appraisal claim regardless of the outcome.7  This has been seen as 
an extremely advantageous aspect for appraisal petitioners because it 
provides a relatively high interest rate when compared to a regular 
investment’s interest rate.8  The statutory interest rate available to 
appraisal petitioners limits the risk inherent in bringing an appraisal 
claim and likely provides appraisal arbitrageurs a substantial investment 
profit regardless of their claim’s success.  Abolishing or significantly 
lowering the statutory interest rate eliminates the safety net provided to 
potential appraisal arbitrageurs.  Overall, reforms to section 262 
eliminating the purchase of shares after the record date and limiting 
statutory interest stand to limit the amount of appraisal arbitrage engaged 
in by predatory hedge funds and reduce the unintended litigation 
imposed on the Delaware court system. 
This Comment traces the evolution of shareholder appraisal rights 
under section 262 and explores the solution to the rapidly growing 
problem of appraisal arbitrage.  Part II of this Comment documents the 
factors leading to the rise of appraisal arbitrage and the aspects that have 
made it a lucrative investment strategy for hedge funds and activist 
shareholders.  Part III then proposes a two-pronged reform to section 262 
and examines the economic and policy incentives to support such 
reforms as the best solution to ending appraisal arbitrage.  Finally, this 
Comment proposes that targeted reforms to section 262 will further the 
legislative purpose behind section 262, and substantially limit appraisal 
arbitrage’s harmful effects on merger transactions across the country. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Before discussing potential reforms to limit appraisal arbitrage, it is 
important to understand the purpose behind section 262’s formation, and 
the evolution of case law that has given life to appraisal arbitrage.  
Appraisal arbitrage has a humble beginning with the codification of 
section 262 and the creation of appraisal rights.  Section 262 allows 
minority shareholders that dissent from an impending merger the ability 
to petition the court and potentially receive what they perceive as the fair 
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value of their shares.9  In recent years, case law interpretations such as In 
re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.10 and In re Appraisal of 
Ancestry.com, Inc.11 have given life to the practice of appraisal arbitrage 
by minimizing its risk and increasing its potential profitability.12  Hedge 
funds and activist shareholders across the country have flocked to the 
practice of appraisal arbitrage by purchasing large amounts of a target 
company’s shares after a merger has been announced with the sole 
intention of bringing an appraisal claim in the Delaware court.13  The 
Delaware State Bar Association has proposed amendments to section 
262, but the Delaware legislature has yet to propose any legislation 
adopting these amendments likely because they fail to provide a viable 
solution to end appraisal arbitrage.14  Lastly, a positive trend has emerged 
in Delaware appraisal actions with the courts tending to favor the merger 
price as a fair assessment of the appraisal value in reasonable situations 
rather than other costly and confusing valuation methods.15 
A. Usage and History of Section 262 
Historically, a corporation’s board of directors was required to obtain 
unanimous shareholder approval prior to all significant corporate 
decisions including the decision to execute a merger.16  The unanimous 
shareholder requirement provided a single shareholder with an extremely 
significant veto power, enabling the shareholder to block all corporate 
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actions with just a single vote.17  This voting requirement created a “hold 
up” problem where any shareholder could prevent a beneficial change 
from being performed in a corporation.18 
1. The Delaware Legislature’s Response: Section 262 
The Delaware legislature responded by enacting statutes that allow 
corporations to execute fundamental corporate changes with majority 
shareholder consent rather than unanimity.19  In anticipation of a merger 
situation “the Legislature created appraisal rights in an effort to 
compensate minority holders for the loss of the veto power and to give 
dissenters the right to demand fair value of shares.”20  The legislature 
created appraisal rights to strike a balance of power between majority 
and minority shareholders by providing majority shareholders a broader 
authority to make beneficial decisions on the company’s behalf and 
foster growth.21  In contrast, appraisal rights protect minority 
shareholders by providing dissenting shareholders a way out of an 
unwanted transaction while also compensating them with a fair value for 
their shares.22 
Recently, the primary purpose of appraisal rights has shifted its focus 
to primarily protecting minority shareholders from majority shareholders 
engaged in conflict transactions.23  This shift became a larger focus when 
courts and legislatures expanded the scope of a majority shareholder’s 
power, thus allowing the leaders of a corporation to conduct a merger 
forcing minority shareholders out of the corporation and compensating 
them with cash.24  Since this change, appraisal right’s primary focus 
shifted to protecting minority shareholders from the overreaching actions 
of majority shareholders.25 
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2. Procedural Requirements to Bring an Appraisal Action 
Under Delaware law, appraisal rights can be triggered by some but 
not all merger transactions.26  Section 262(b) provides for a “market-out 
exception” that eliminates appraisal rights for shareholders of companies 
that are widely traded,27 unless such shareholders are paid consideration 
in cash as a result of their force out.28  However, any company may 
provide appraisal rights to shareholders in its certificate of 
incorporation.29 
Under section 262(a), appraisal rights are limited to shareholders 
who dissent from a forced merger transaction.30  Dissenting shareholders 
are required to comply with multiple procedural requirements to be 
considered eligible for an appraisal remedy.31  Such procedural 
requirements include: voting in opposition to the merger or abstaining 
from voting altogether, producing a written demand to the company for 
appraisal rights, commencement of an appraisal proceeding within 120 
days after the effective date of the merger, and each shareholder 
maintaining ownership of their shares through the effective date of the 
merger.32  In addition, dissenting shareholders have the ultimate burden 
of establishing their right to an appraisal of their stock’s value by the 
court.33  Although appraisal rights are filled with procedural 
requirements, an evolution of case law has provided substantial 
motivation for hedge funds and activist shareholders to take advantage of 
appraisal rights. 
B. The Rise of Appraisal Arbitrage 
Over the past decade, appraisal claims have had a limited presence in 
Delaware courts and have been insignificant in terms of Delaware 
legislative reform.  In the past, appraisal claims have not provided a 
significant reason for concern because appraisal claims have maintained 
a consistent correlation to the amount of mergers taking place in the 
                                                          
 26.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2016). 
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marketplace.34  From 2004 to 2007, the number of appraisal petitions 
stayed fairly consistent with the amount of merger transactions and both 
fell after the financial crisis.35 
However, in the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in 
the amount of appraisal claims brought by minority shareholders.  In 
2011, the amount of appraisal claims nearly doubled, and by 2013, the 
percentage of transactions that attracted an appraisal petition tripled from 
5% to 15% of all merger transactions.36  In addition, the value at stake in 
each individual appraisal claim has significantly increased.  In 2013, 
dissenting shareholders brought an aggregate amount of $1.5 billion in 
appraisal claims.37  This amount is ten times the value brought by 
dissenting shareholders in 2004, and more than five times the highest 
value of dissenting shares in the five years prior.38 
Interestingly, the amount of appraisal claims and the overall value at 
issue have all increased independently and by greater degrees than the 
amount of mergers taking place.39  This phenomenon is due to the 
overwhelming growth of specialized litigation used by repeat hedge 
funds and activist shareholders designed to take advantage of minority 
shareholder appraisal statutes.40 
There are multiple factors that have contributed to appraisal 
arbitrage’s recent development as a lucrative investment strategy.  The 
main factor contributing to this phenomenon arose in the 2007 case of In 
re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.,41 where the Delaware 
Court of Chancery’s decision resulted in a significant incentive for hedge 
funds and activist shareholders to practice appraisal arbitrage.42  The 
holding in Transkaryotic was recently reaffirmed by the Delaware Court 
of Chancery in In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc.43  In addition to the 
case law developments in this area, the method of calculating interest on 
pending claims in section 262(h) provides additional incentive for 
                                                          
 34.  Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1569. 
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 37.  Id. at 1553. 
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 42.  Wolf et al., supra note 12, at 1. 
 43.  No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 66825, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015). 
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arbitrageurs to bring claims against merging corporations.44  Overall, 
Delaware’s case law interpretation of the statutory language in section 
262 has opened the floodgate for hedge funds to take advantage of 
Delaware’s appraisal statutes. 
C. Case Summary of In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. 
Statutory appraisal was an underutilized remedy prior to the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in In re Appraisal of 
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.45  Statutory appraisal was often not taken 
advantage of because transactions could be structured to avoid appraisal 
rights for minority shareholders altogether, and if appraisal was an 
option, there was a tremendous amount of risk and expense involved in 
bringing a claim.46  The Transkaryotic decision provides one of the first 
and substantial factors as to why appraisal arbitrage is such a lucrative 
and successful investment strategy for hedge funds and activist 
shareholders.  The court’s decision provides appraisal petitioners with a 
significant timing advantage to determine the profitability of bringing an 
appraisal claim. 
1. Transkaryotic Opens the Door for Appraisal Arbitrage 
Appraisal rights under section 262 may only be asserted by 
shareholders who chose to vote against the merger or abstained from 
voting altogether.47  The plaintiff shareholders asserting an appraisal 
claim in Transkaryotic purchased the majority of their shares after both 
the announcement of the merger and the record date for the shareholder 
meeting, but before the effective date of the merger.48  In a typical 
merger transaction, the merger will be announced to the public and then 
the record date for the shareholder meeting will be set.  The record date 
is the point in time at which the eligibility of voting shareholders to the 
transaction is determined.49  The issue presented in the case was whether 
“a beneficial owner, who acquires shares after the record date, must 
prove that each of its specific shares for which it seeks appraisal was not 
                                                          
 44.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (West 2006 & Supp. 2016). 
 45.  Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345. 
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 49.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (West 2006 & Supp. 2016). 
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voted in favor of the merger” to remain eligible for appraisal rights.50  
The defendant argued that a plaintiff bringing an appraisal claim bears 
the burden of proving that the shares it held were not voted in favor of 
the merger.51 In response, the plaintiffs argued that, in light of modern 
securities practices, it is impracticable and even impossible due to the 
intangible nature of the stock market to trace how shares may have been 
voted when shares are purchased after the record date.52 
To grasp the logic behind the holding in Transkaryotic, an 
underlying issue regarding modern securities practices requires further 
explanation.  The majority of shares issued by modern-day public 
companies no longer exist in a certificated form, but exist “on deposit” 
with central securities depositories.53  “Beneficial owners,” such as the 
plaintiffs in Transkaryotic, enjoy the benefit of ownership—including 
voting—but their shares may be held by another entity such as a central 
depository, brokerage firm, bank, and so forth.54  These beneficial 
owners have no traceable ownership claim to specific shares held by 
central securities depositories.55  Therefore, if a beneficial owner’s shares 
have been purchased after the record date, there is no way of proving that 
their shares were not voted in favor of the merger. 
The Chancery court ultimately held that shares acquired after the 
record date are eligible for appraisal rights under section 262.  The court 
reasoned that under the literal terms of the statutory text, section 262(a) 
defines a stockholder eligible for appraisal rights as a “holder of 
record.”56  Therefore, only the record holder’s actions may determine 
perfection of appraisal rights.  The ruling in Transkaryotic makes clear 
that “an investor can wait until just before the stockholder vote on a 
merger to purchase a target company’s shares (after having had the 
opportunity to review public disclosure and gauge market conditions), 
and then subsequently file an appraisal claim with respect to those 
shares.”57  The Transkaryotic decision provides a significant timing 
advantage for appraisal arbitrageurs and has been a clear factor in the 
increase of appraisal arbitrage. 
                                                          
 50.  Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at *2. 
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 56.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2016).  
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2. The Transkaryotic Court Acknowledges the Potential for Appraisal 
Arbitrage 
Prior to the ruling in Transkaryotic, appraisal rights were not 
typically considered a lucrative investment or arbitrage strategy because 
investors assumed they could not buy shares after the record date and 
then subsequently assert appraisal rights.58  The defendants asserted that 
the court’s ruling would undermine the goals of the appraisal statute by 
“allowing it to be used as an investment tool for arbitrageurs as opposed 
to a statutory safety net for objecting stockholders.”59  The holding 
allows appraisal arbitrageurs additional time to make the decision of 
whether to buy a target company’s stock for the purpose of pursuing 
appraisal rights.60  This decision creates a timing advantage for investors 
that provides them with the ability to analyze a company’s proxy 
statements relating to the sale process, determine if the price is low, 
assess any pre-closing shareholder litigation, and evaluate the market 
conditions for an extended period of time.61  This provides investors with 
a distinct advantage by decreasing the possibility of a risky purchase and 
maximizing the success of an appraisal claim.62 
The court responded to this argument by noting that the ruling was a 
direct result of section 262’s statutory language.63  The language within 
section 262 clearly provides that appraisal rights are exclusively for the 
“holder of record.”64  This clear and controlling language directs the 
court to solely evaluate the holder of record to determine appraisal rights 
rather than beneficial holders that may have purchased their shares after 
the record date.  Therefore, the solution to the issue of appraisal arbitrage 
“more properly lies with the Legislature” rather than in the courts.65  
Overall, the court followed the strict and plain language of section 262, 
and placed the legislature in a position to “avoid the evil” of appraisal 
arbitrage.66 
 
                                                          
 58.  Id. 
 59.  In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5 
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
 60.  Bomba et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5. 
 64.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2016).  
 65.  Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5. 
 66.  Id. 
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3. In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc. Reaffirms the Holding in 
Transkaryotic 
Since Transkaryotic, Delaware courts have been firm in relying on 
section 262’s statutory language to assert that section 262 does not 
prohibit the purchase of a company’s shares after the record date.  In 
early January of 2015, the Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed the 
Transkaryotic decision in the case of In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, 
Inc.67  The dissenting shareholder in this appraisal action was Merion 
Capital, a hedge fund that is one of the largest repeat petitioners in the 
game of appraisal arbitrage with over $700 million invested in Delaware 
appraisal claims.68  Merion bought stock in Ancestry.com after the record 
date and quickly announced its intention for appraisal of its shares.69  As 
in Transkaryotic, Ancestry.com filed a motion for summary judgment 
arguing that Merion was not able to show that the shares it purchased 
after the record date were not voted in favor of the merger.70  The court 
denied Ancestry.com’s motion and reaffirmed the ruling in 
Transkaryotic holding that “the actions of beneficial holders are 
irrelevant in appraisal matters.”71  Again the court noted that imposing a 
share-tracing requirement for all parties that assert appraisal rights would 
be inappropriate because such a requirement is not found in the statutory 
language of section 262.72  If such a change were implemented, it would 
be a “legislative, not a judicial, function.”73 
Overall, when looking at both Transkaryotic and Ancestry.com the 
courts have remained consistent in relying on the plain statutory 
language in section 262 to decide that a share-tracing requirement is not 
required for beneficial holders of stock that dissent from a merger 
transaction.74  Ultimately, these holdings allow hedge funds and activist 
shareholders the opportunity to seek appraisal for shares purchased after 
a merger’s public announcement that possibly have already been voted in 
favor of the merger.  This valuable advantage has been the main factor 
leading to the increased popularity of appraisal arbitrage and has created 
                                                          
 67.  In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173–VCG, 2015 WL 66825, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 5, 2015). 
 68.  Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1574–75. 
 69.  Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 66825, at *2. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at *6. 
 72.  Id. at *9.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5 
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007); Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 66825, at *6. 
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a more lucrative and risk-free investment strategy for hedge funds and 
shareholder activists to take advantage of.75  These courts have recently 
reaffirmed the idea that the Delaware legislature will need to take action 
to solve appraisal arbitrage because courts will continue to abide by the 
plain language of the statute.76 
D. Section 262(h) and the Statutory Interest Rate Advantage 
Another explanation for the recent dramatic increase in appraisal 
arbitrage can be linked to the interest rate available to petitioners while in 
the process of an appraisal claim.77  Appraisal petitioners are entitled to 
statutory interest on their claims by section 262 while their claim is being 
decided by the Delaware courts.78  Delaware amended the statutory 
language of section 262(h) in 200779 to provide that “[u]nless the Court 
in its discretion determines otherwise for good cause shown . . . interest 
from the effective date of the merger through the date of payment of the 
judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the 
Federal Reserve discount rate.”80 
1. The Purpose Behind Statutory Interest 
When a shareholder brings an appraisal claim rather than vote in 
favor of the merger, the shareholder “loses the traditional benefits of 
stock ownership: the right to vote stock and to receive payment of 
dividends or other distribution upon the shares.”81  Essentially, the 
shareholder places the investment “in limbo” until the court rules on the 
petitioner’s right to appraisal and determines the fair market value of the 
shares.82  As a result, shareholders have no right to receive income from 
their ownership in the merging corporation while waiting on an uncertain 
decision by the court system.  In addition, such shareholders must 
account for the expenses that come with the appraisal process.83  This 
leaves shareholders in an uncomfortable position.  The statutory interest 
                                                          
 75.  Gattuso & Hirzel, supra note 46, at 1. 
 76.  Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 66825, at *6. 
 77.  Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1579. 
 78.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (West 2006 & Supp. 2016). 
 79.  Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1580. 
 80.  § 262(h).  
 81.  Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co. on Behalf of Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 657 A.2d 
254, 259 (Del. 1995). 
 82.  Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 312 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 83.  § 262(j). 
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provided in section 262 is meant to compensate dissenting shareholders 
while waiting for an appraisal claim to come to fruition.84  Absent good 
cause to find otherwise, minority shareholders will receive 5% in excess 
of the Federal Reserve discount rate on the value of their shares, 
regardless of the claim’s outcome.85 
Section 262 provides that appraisal petitioners will receive statutory 
interest unless good cause is shown to provide otherwise.86  In Merion 
Capital, LP v. 3M Cogent, Inc.,87 the court provided that Delaware law 
does not disfavor an appraisal petitioner because they purchased their 
shares after the record date for statutory interest purposes.88  In addition, 
statutory interest protects appraisal petitioners from the unfair windfall of 
a company’s free use of their merger proceeds at no cost for the duration 
of the appraisal action.89  The Merion decision made it apparent that a 
corporation’s effort to eliminate a petitioner’s interest right under section 
262(h) will be extremely difficult.90 
2. Statutory Interest as a Means to Appraisal Arbitrage 
The statutory interest rate is a substantial mitigating factor when a 
shareholder is faced with the substantial risks of bringing an appraisal 
claim.91  Hedge funds and activist shareholders that purchase shares in 
anticipation of bringing an appraisal claim have the ability to reap the 
benefits of this statutory interest rate in addition to the long-time 
shareholders for whom section 262 provides protection.  Even if a 
shareholder dissents from the merger and receives close to nothing or 
only a small amount over the merger price from the court, “statutory 
interest may still provide a reasonably competitive rate of return in the 
current market.”92  Some lawyers have argued that in a period of “ultra-
low” interest rates, engaging in appraisal litigation can be a lucrative 
investment opportunity regardless of the overall outcome of the appraisal 
petition due to the high likelihood of receiving a generous rate of 
interest.93  Additionally, the interest rate is, at a minimum, an offset to 
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the extended period of illiquidity and litigation costs appraisal 
arbitrageur’s endure during the litigation period.94 
The potential of a significant return on investment with theoretically 
little risk can be an incentive for hedge funds and activist shareholders to 
bring appraisal actions.  The Delaware courts have provided that there is 
a growing “concern about whether the interest rate that the Legislature 
has set encourages these types of appraisal cases” and provides an 
incentive for a petitioner to move slowly throughout the appraisal 
process.95  In addition, a sizeable claim can result in a large interest 
payment that lands on the surviving company’s shoulders.96  The 
statutory interest rate raises the threat of a huge interest cost that could 
possibly force companies into considering unfavorable settlements with 
aggressive stockholders pursing an appraisal action.97  Such a fear 
presents a substantial threat to corporate mergers, and provides hedge 
funds and activist shareholders a fair amount of leverage by threatening 
to impose an extremely large interest payment. 
E. The Delaware State Bar Provides Unsatisfactory Reforms to Section 
262 
There have been recent reforms relevant to Delaware corporation law 
presented in Delaware Senate Bill 75.98  The Corporate Law Section of 
the Delaware State Bar Association originally included two reforms 
attempting to limit the investment practice of appraisal arbitrage (the 
“Bar’s Appraisal Amendments”).  However, the Delaware legislature 
failed to propose legislation to adopt the Bar Appraisal Amendments to 
section 262 likely because they were unsuccessful in substantially 
limiting appraisal arbitrage.99  The Bar Appraisal Amendments proposed: 
“(a) would limit otherwise qualified appraisal claims if the claim is 
below a certain threshold [limit], and (b) toll the accrual of statutory 
interest on any portion of consideration paid to the shareholder during 
the pendency of the 262 appraisal proceeding.”100 
The first reform provides a threshold limitation that seeks to 
eliminate “de minimis” appraisal claims designed solely to gain leverage 
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in settlement negotiations in limited public company transactions.101  
This limitation on so-called “nuisance claims” has been criticized for not 
doing enough to limit the types of claims that are considered appraisal 
arbitrage.102  However, the second reform dealing with the statutory 
interest rate would give corporations the option to pay off appraisal 
petitioners at an earlier stage of the appraisal process, as a means of 
ceasing the accrual of interest.103 
If the statutory interest reform were put in place, it would give the 
surviving corporation of a merger the option to pay the appraisal 
petitioner a reasonable sum determined by the corporation at any time 
prior to a final judgment.104  Once the payment was made, interest would 
no longer accrue on the amount paid by the corporation.105  However, the 
corporation making such payments would be required to make the same 
payment to all appraisal claimants, unless there were a good faith basis 
for contesting a shareholder’s entitlement to an appraisal.106  Such 
reforms are meant to address the growing concerns over increased 
appraisal activity by hedge funds attempting to take advantage of 
dissenting shareholders statutory appraisal rights.107 
While the Delaware State Bar Association has approved the Bar’s 
Appraisal Amendments, the Delaware legislature has not yet proposed 
any legislation adopting these reforms.108  Attorneys have concluded that 
the lack of proposed legislation may be due to an “industry concern that 
the proposed amendments do not go far enough” to limit appraisal 
arbitrage by, for example, “denying appraisal rights for shares purchased 
after the announcement of the merger or at least after the record date.”109  
However, there is still optimism (even if only my own) for the Bar’s 
Appraisal Amendments to be improved and become adopted legislation 
in 2016 or subsequent years.  While statutory interest significantly 
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increases the occurrence of appraisal arbitrage, the method of valuation 
in an appraisal proceeding provides another complex layer promoting 
appraisal arbitrage. 
F. Valuation in an Appraisal Proceeding 
A brief background of the valuation methods courts implement to 
determine the “fair value” of appraisal petitioner’s shares is essential to 
understanding the overall impact of appraisal arbitrage.  If an appraisal 
claimant satisfies the procedural requirements, valuation determines 
whether the claimant will receive a monetary award for their stock.  
While typically courts will rely on valuation experts using a discounted 
cash flow valuation method or something similar to determine “fair 
value,” a recent trend may indicate that Delaware courts are beginning to 
heavily rely on the merger price. 
1. Valuation Methodology Used in Delaware 
When the Delaware courts are faced with assigning a value to the 
sale of a corporate enterprise they are confronted with an extremely 
complex analysis.110  When evaluating the sale price of a simple asset, 
the market value is considered to be the true fair value of the asset.111  
However, section 262(h) does not adhere to this principle due to the 
complexity involved when assessing the value of the sale of a corporate 
enterprise.112  The Delaware Supreme Court has clarified that “in 
appraisal actions, this court must not begin its analysis with a 
presumption that a particular valuation method is appropriate, but must 
instead examine all relevant methodologies and factors, consistent with 
the appraisal statute.”113  This precedent obligates the court to use “all 
relevant factors” when evaluating the fair value of a company’s 
transaction.114 
Typically, the court relies on expert valuations from both the 
merging corporation and the dissenting shareholders, which commonly 
use a discounted cash flow analysis or other comparable company 
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analyses to assess the statutory fair value.115  In addition, the market 
value (the sale price of the corporation) is sometimes used when the 
court determines it is reasonably derived.116  Expert valuations can 
provide the court with figures ranging from below the sale price to more 
than twice the actual sales price of the transaction.117  Overall, Delaware 
courts are provided with an abundant amount of information making the 
determination of fair value a difficult process. 
2. Usage of the Merger Price as “Fair Value” 
Historically, the court has relied on the merger price in limited 
circumstances as evidence of fair value if the events leading to the 
transaction are considered reliable indicators of the transaction’s value 
and merger-specific value is excluded.118  In 2010, the court in Golden 
Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP119 declined to adopt a rule requiring the 
Chancellor or Vice Chancellors to defer conclusively or presumptively to 
the deal price as the best indication of fair value in an appraisal 
proceeding.120  The court stated: 
Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of Chancery to 
perform an independent evaluation of “fair value” at the time of a 
transaction.  It vests the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors with 
significant discretion to consider “all relevant factors” and determine 
the going concern value of the underlying company.  Requiring the 
Court of Chancery to defer—conclusively or presumptively—to the 
merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged transactional 
process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and 
the reasoned holdings of our precedent.  It would inappropriately shift 
the responsibility to determine “fair value” from the court to the private 
parties.  Also, while it is difficult for the Chancellor and Vice 
Chancellors to assess wildly divergent expert opinions regarding value, 
inflexible rules governing appraisal provide little additional benefit in 
determining “fair value” because of the already high costs of appraisal 
actions.  Appraisal is, by design, a flexible process.  Therefore, we 
reject Golden’s contention that the Vice Chancellor erred by 
insufficiently deferring to the merger price, and we reject its call to 
                                                          
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Kevin R. Shannon & Christopher N. Kelly, Ckx Decisions Reveal Developments in 
Delaware Stock Appraisal Rules, 28 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. 1, 2 (2014). 
 119.  11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). 
 120.  Id. at 219. 
514 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
establish a rule requiring the Court of Chancery to defer to the merger 
price in any appraisal proceeding.121 
While in certain situations the merger price is a reliable indicator of 
fair value, the Golden Telecom decision blurs its beneficial application in 
determining fair value. 
This opinion along with multiple cases declining to give any value to 
the merger price122 led practitioners to believe that when the court begins 
evaluation of fair value, the merger price was irrelevant and unreliable.123  
However, the recent decision of Huff Fund v. CKx124 provided a 
valuation that solely relied on the merger price because the sales process 
resulted in “an arms-length merger price resulting from an effective 
market check.”125  Such a ruling is important precedent for future 
appraisal petitions, and resolves an issue of debate among practitioners 
who doubt the courts’ value of the merger price in appraisal cases.126  
Following suit, Delaware courts have started to use the transaction’s 
merger price as a correct assessment of  “fair value” for appraisal 
proceedings more frequently.127  Such courts have relied on the merger 
price for various reasons ranging from a lack of reliable alternative 
evaluation methods128 to a determination that the merger price was 
derived from an untainted and arms-length sales process.129  However, 
recently the Delaware Court of Chancery in In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc. 
provided that even in the face of an arms-length sales process, the court 
is not required to rely on the merger price to determine fair value.130  
While the courts must not give a presumption to a single evaluation 
method, many courts have come to view the merger price as an 
acceptable method of determining “fair value.”131  Overall, the court may 
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be faced with “wildly divergent expert opinions regarding value”132 and 
there seems to be a trend of using the merger price to determine the fair 
value of a transaction.133 
3. Merger Price Valuation Regarding “Interested” and “Disinterested” 
Transactions 
From 2010 to 2014, Delaware courts determined in seven of nine 
cases that the fair value of appraisal petitioners’ shares was higher than 
the agreed on merger price.134  Only one of the cases had an appraisal 
award that was lower than the merger price, and there was only one case 
in which the appraisal award was the same as the agreed on merger 
price.135  The courts deemed five of the seven cases that resulted in a 
higher appraisal price over the agreed merger price as “interested 
transactions,”136 while two of the cases were labeled as “disinterested 
transactions.”137  Both cases that did not result in a higher appraisal price 
than the actual merger were considered disinterested transactions.138 
The five appraisal claims regarded as interested transactions received 
appraisal awards significantly above the merger price ranging from 
19.5% to 148.8% above the merger price.139  In contrast, the four 
transactions labeled as disinterested, had only two determinations of 
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value above the merger price, with the highest being a 15.6% increase.140  
Such a blatant difference in appraisal determinations is likely an attempt 
to protect minority shareholders from interested transactions.141 
Overall, the method of reaching the fair value of shares fluctuates 
based on the facts of the case.  However, the information stemming from 
recent cases might suggest that an option to limit appraisal arbitrage in 
valuation proceedings may lie in the corporation’s deal structure.  While 
corporations have the ability to structure a deal that reduces the 
likelihood of a successful appraisal claim, the focus should be targeted 
on a dissenting shareholder’s eligibility to bring an appraisal claim.  The 
reforms explored in Part III of this Comment limit hedge funds and 
activist shareholders’ eligibility to bring an appraisal claim in the first 
place and effectively limit the practice of appraisal arbitrage. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The most effective solution to limiting the practice of appraisal 
arbitrage conducted by hedge funds and activist shareholders lies in a 
two-prong legislative reform of section 262.  The reform will aim to 
heighten the amount of risk arbitrageurs take when engaging in appraisal 
arbitrage.  The reduction of appraisal arbitrage will positively impact 
merger transactions across the nation by minimizing deal threatening 
litigation and providing more confidence in pricing negotiations between 
potential merging partners.  An amendment to Delaware statutes sets the 
precedent for states across the country (including Kansas)142 that model 
their state corporation law after Delaware, and significantly impacts the 
majority of corporations incorporated in Delaware.  In addition, limiting 
appraisal arbitrage will also aid to reduce the larger picture of predatory 
shareholder litigation that, in effect, has become a standard “deal tax” on 
merger transactions.143  While arguments exist that appraisal arbitrage is 
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a useful side effect of section 262 that benefits public shareholders,144 
eliminating appraisal arbitrage will benefit not only the Delaware court 
system and merger transactions across the country, but would also limit 
appraisal actions to the shareholders section 262 was initially designed to 
protect. 
The first prong to limiting appraisal arbitrage lies in amending 
section 262 to state expressly that appraisal rights are not available to a 
shareholder that purchases shares of a merging corporation after the 
record date.  Such an amendment would effectively overrule the 
decisions in In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. and In re 
Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc. However, this reform is in line with the 
Delaware courts’ decisions by placing reform in the hands of the 
legislature rather than the judiciary.145  The second prong to eliminating 
appraisal arbitrage lies in reducing the statutory interest rate that provides 
appraisal petitioners 5% interest above the then current Federal Reserve 
interest rate. 
The two-prong solution outlined above will significantly limit 
appraisal arbitrage by heightening the risk appraisal arbitrageurs must 
take when bringing an appraisal claim, while maintaining protection for 
the dissenting shareholders the statute was designed to protect.  In 
addition, the Delaware courts’ recent trend of utilizing the merger price 
as the “fair value” for shares when conducting valuation in an appraisal 
proceeding is a step in the right direction towards limiting appraisal 
arbitrage.  Overall, the suggested reforms to section 262 provide a great 
advantage to the Delaware court system and to corporations involved in 
merger transactions by significantly limiting the number of hedge funds 
attempting to take advantage of a statute designed to protect dissenting 
shareholders. 
A. Eliminating Appraisal Arbitrage Starts with Abolishing the 
Economic Incentives 
The recent upswing in hedge fund and activist shareholder use of 
appraisal arbitrage has created a substantial negative impact on the 
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mergers and acquisitions market.  Merging companies face substantial 
risks as they consider a potential merger including: a large appraisal 
judgment, coercion from a strong group of dissenting shareholders, and a 
threat to the success and profitability of the overall merger. 
1. Appraisal Arbitrage Imposes Consequences on the Success of 
Merger Transactions 
One of the largest threats appraisal arbitrage presents is to the deal 
dynamics between merging companies.146  “[P]otential buyers of 
companies must now assess the possibility of appraisal actions being 
brought against them” forcing companies in merger transactions to 
evaluate additional risks in the transaction.147  The structure of the deal 
and the process towards reaching a conclusive sales price between the 
parties can be a significant factor in the likelihood of a substantial 
appraisal award.148   
The potential of being faced with a large appraisal proceeding forces 
many companies to reach a settlement with shareholders before the court 
grants a large judgment.149  Activists will publicly and aggressively 
encourage other stockholders to join in an appraisal action, “increasing 
the threat of the proceeding to the target board—and thus, as a result, the 
activist’s leverage in negotiating a settlement,” presenting a serious 
threat to the ultimate success of a deal.150  The easy answer would be for 
corporations to structure their deals with the anticipation of potential 
appraisal litigation as a cost factor.  However, the effects and probability 
of a significant appraisal award or substantial interest payment can be 
extremely difficult for a company to predict.151  The mechanics of 
structuring a transaction in anticipation of such litigation, in addition to 
the regular fiduciary litigation that commonly accompanies merger 
transactions, presents a substantial problem.152 
In addition, the target company’s sale process is “unknown to the 
buy-side party until the company’s proxy statement is furnished to the 
shareholders.”153  Buyers have no certainty as to whether the seller may 
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have incorrectly prepared the selling corporation’s projections or a 
myriad of other possibilities subjecting the deal to an increased risk of 
appraisal petitions.154  Overall, appraisal litigation has a significant effect 
on the development and success of potential merger transactions, and 
such litigation is extremely difficult to structure into a potential deal. 
2. Appraisal Arbitrage Postures Merging Parties in an Adversarial 
Position 
There is also a major concern that both buyers and sellers will 
struggle to find an appropriate price for the merger transaction.155  
Buyers may account for the potential cost of appraisal litigation through 
the use of appraisal conditions.156  Appraisal conditions often provide “a 
condition to the merger that not more than a specified percentage, often 
10%, of the outstanding target shares seek appraisal rights.”157  If there 
are dissenting shareholders that exceed the specified threshold limit, an 
acquirer may decide to not close the transaction.158  
Conditions such as these have the potential to put buyers and sellers 
at odds.159  Sellers are likely to resist any appraisal closing condition as a 
part of the merger, and if they compromise and concede to one, they will 
likely advocate for the condition to be set very high.160  Buyers that have 
not negotiated an appraisal rights condition, may be confronted with an 
exceedingly large payment to dissenting shareholders as a result of an 
appraisal action, increasing the likelihood that the negotiated financing 
provided to structure the deal will be inadequate.161  The outcome of this 
negotiation will vary significantly, but it will undoubtedly be a difficult 
topic for both parties and can potentially cause the deal not to close.162 
An appraisal condition can be of consequence to both the seller and 
the buyer, by providing shareholders with leverage and inviting coercive 
shareholder behavior that both sides of the transaction would like to 
                                                          
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Id. at 4. 
 156.  Id. at 5. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Anna Karin F. Manalaysay, Rise in “Dissenting Shareholder” Merger Conditions, 
POMERANTZ LLP (March/April 2014), http://pomerantzlawfirm.com/publications/2015/6/22/rise-in-
dissenting-shareholder-merger-conditions. 
 159.  See generally Latham & Watkins LLP, Appraisal Arbitrage: Will it Become a New Hedge 
Fund Strategy?, M&A DEAL COMMENTARY (May 2007), 
https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1883_1.pdf. 
 160.  See id. at 3–4. 
 161.  Bomba et al., supra note 2, at 4. 
 162.  Latham & Watkins LLP, supra note 159, at 3–4. 
520 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
discourage.163  For instance, if a transaction is headed in the direction of 
a positive shareholder vote, an appraisal condition may create leverage 
for the dissenting shareholders to threaten the success of the entire 
transaction.164  Overall, “an appraisal condition sets up a very 
unfavorable negotiating dynamic for the buyer and is not in the long-
term interests of the seller”165 effectively creating a notable threat to the 
success of the merger. 
In addition, the possibility of a large dissenting shareholder payout 
may not arise until a time significantly past closing.166  This leaves 
buyers with a large judgment while attempting to lead a recently merged 
corporation.  These risks come with additional concerns including fear 
that a shareholder vote requiring a majority of the shares outstanding in 
favor of the merger may not be attainable.167  Lastly, there remains a 
large degree of uncertainty as to the methods a court will use to 
determine the fair value of the shares in an appraisal action.168  Overall, 
reforms are needed to eliminate the practice of appraisal arbitrage as it 
continues to grow because the practice is having a significant negative 
impact on the merger and acquisition market. 
B.  Overruling Transkaryotic and Ancestory.com Makes Sense Because 
it Eliminates Economic Advantage and Aligns with the Legislative 
Purpose Behind Section 262 
The signature piece of proposed legislation discussed in this 
Comment preempts the Transkaryotic decision by amending section 262 
to prohibit appraisal rights for shareholders that purchase shares of a 
merging corporation after the record date.  Such a reform is being highly 
sought after by corporations and firms across the country.  A group of 
large Wall Street law firms169 have banded together to urge the Delaware 
legislature to limit appraisal arbitrage by prohibiting the eligibility of 
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appraisal rights for shares purchased after the record date.170  These law 
firms’ top clients are the private equity buyers and target companies that 
face the risks outlined above, and suffer the consequences of appraisal 
arbitrage.171  The firms reasoned that prohibiting the purchase of a 
merging company’s shares after the record date would “reduce the 
unseemly claims-buying that is rampant and serves no legitimate 
equitable or other purpose.”172 
1. The Economic Advantage Stemming From Transkaryotic 
The proposed reforms will significantly limit the investment practice 
of appraisal arbitrage by eliminating a hedge fund or activist 
shareholder’s economic advantage of purchasing shares after the record 
date.  In a typical merger transaction, the merger is announced to the 
public and then the record date for the shareholder meeting is set.173  As 
provided by Transkaryotic, a hedge fund or activist shareholder has the 
opportunity to buy shares of a merging company after the record date and 
up until the eve of the shareholder vote on the transaction and still 
remain eligible for appraisal rights.174  Ultimately, Transkaryotic allows 
appraisal rights for shares that may have even been voted in favor of the 
merger by a previous shareholder if purchased after the record date.175  
Preventing hedge funds and activist shareholders from surveying the 
corporate landscape up until the shareholder vote or the merger’s closing 
will significantly assist in limiting the amount of disingenuous appraisal 
litigation taking place because it revokes the valuable economic 
advantage of bringing a claim. 
2. The Ability to Purchase Shares After The Record Date Alters the 
Intended Purpose of Section 262 
“It is well established in finance that the ability to delay an 
investment is valuable because it allows the investor to make a more 
                                                          
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Jetley & Xinyu Ji, supra note 5, at 436.  
 174.  In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345 at *10–
14 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
 175.  Id.; Theodore N. Mirvis et al., Delaware Court Decisions on Appraisal Rights Highlight 
Need for Reform, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/21/delaware-court-decisions-on-appraisal-rights-highlight-
need-for-reform/. 
522 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
informed investment decision.”176  Appraisal arbitrageurs are being given 
this valuable advantage by having the ability to purchase shares after the 
record date.  Under section 262(d)(1), a shareholder seeking appraisal 
must submit a written demand prior to the shareholder vote.177  On 
average, there is a total of 32 days between the notice date and the 
shareholder vote.178  However, in practice the interpretation of the statute 
has led to generic written demands without a specific number of shares 
listed for appraisal.179  This allows for flexibility to increase the amount 
of shares for appraisal up to the closing of the merger.180  When looking 
at a typical merger transaction “the average time period between the 
record date and deal consummation is 74 days.”181  Having the ability to 
survey the market landscape after the record date for an average of 74 
days before closing provides such investment strategists with surety in 
the profitability of the mergers in which they seek appraisal.  Whether an 
appraisal arbitrageur has an additional 32 or 74 days, this extra time not 
only allows dissenting shareholders to survey the market landscape, but 
also provides additional time to analyze proxy statements and newly 
disclosed information that would make an appraisal claim more or less 
attractive.182 
Closing this time period gap heightens the risk of an appraisal claim 
for all hedge funds and activist shareholders attempting to take advantage 
of section 262.  The original purpose of section 262 was to protect the 
long-term investors in a company who are wronged by being forced out 
at an unfair price.  The proposed legislation stands to fulfill the 
legislative purpose of protecting dissenting shareholders, while reducing 
the amount of appraisal arbitrage and its negative effect on corporations 
across the nation. 
C. The Misguided Policy Rationale of the Recent Section 262 Proposed 
Amendments 
The Bar’s Appraisal Amendments to section 262 that have yet to be 
enacted by the Delaware legislature fail to heed the cry of the merger and 
acquisition community by providing a provision limiting appraisal claims 
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to shareholders who purchased their shares before the record date.  The 
Delaware State Bar Association appointed a subcommittee of the 
Corporate Law Section (the “Council”) to evaluate the scope of the 
amendments to section 262 and whether the statute should limit appraisal 
arbitrage.183  Ultimately, the Council chose not to include the Bar’s 
Appraisal Amendments, and published an accompanying paper that 
provides the Council’s reasoning for concluding not to include 
amendments limiting appraisal arbitrage in Delaware Senate Bill 75.184  
While the economic advantage of purchasing shares after the record date 
has been conclusively shown to benefit hedge funds and activist 
shareholders,185 the Council’s reasoning for failing to limit appraisal 
arbitrage has yet to be analyzed. 
1. Eliminating Appraisal Arbitrage Furthers the Council’s Policy 
Objective of Protecting Dissenting Shareholders by Eliminating 
Parties the Statute Never Intended to Protect and Preserving 
Appraisal for Deserving Shareholders 
The Council provided various reasons as to why it decided not to 
limit the practice of appraisal arbitrage.  Overall, it stated that the 
“Council does not believe appraisal arbitrage upsets a proper balance 
between the ability of corporations to engage in desirable value 
enhancing transactions and the ability of dissenting stockholders to 
receive fair value for their holdings.”186  While the Council’s arguments 
seemingly provide valid legislative policy, the Council fails to provide 
adequate reasoning for its decision not to limit appraisal arbitrage.  There 
is an incentive to encourage corporations to engage in desirable value 
enhancing transactions, and the goal is to preserve the ability of 
dissenting stockholders to receive fair value in their shares when faced 
with a merger.  However, the Council’s statement and the supporting 
materials do not provide sufficient reasoning for its failure to limit the 
purchase of shares after the record date, even when faced with 
overwhelming economic and policy arguments supporting such a 
limitation. 
The proposal to limit the purchase of a corporation’s shares after the 
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record date fully supports and aligns with the Council’s policy rationale 
rather than opposing it.  Eliminating or substantially limiting the practice 
of appraisal arbitrage by preventing the purchase of a corporation’s 
shares after the record date aligns with the balance the Council values 
because it incentivizes corporations to reach a fair transaction price and 
restores the legislative purpose of section 262.  A corporation is likely to 
be further incentivized to reach a fair transaction price because a 
reduction in the likelihood of a large appraisal proceeding minimizes the 
concern of a large unanticipated post-closing cost.187  With less risk in 
the closing of a transaction, companies can focus on reaching the best 
deal price possible for its shareholders.  Corporations will likely still face 
an appraisal action by dissenting shareholders if a transaction produces 
an unfair or unsuitable price.  However, without appraisal arbitrage 
claims, corporations will not be faced with insurmountable appraisal 
actions brought by appraisal arbitrageurs looking to capitalize on a 
loophole in section 262.  The Council’s rationale for not enacting a 
limitation to appraisal arbitrage is flawed because the elimination of 
appraisal arbitrage will enhance its objective rather than work in the 
opposite direction. 
2. The Council’s Failure to See the Economic and Policy Incentives to 
Limit Appraisal Arbitrage 
Eliminating appraisal arbitrage furthers the Council’s policy 
objective of protecting dissenting shareholders by eliminating claim 
buying hedge funds the statute never intended to protect, while 
preserving the right to appraisal for dissenting shareholders that have 
been long time holders of a merging corporation’s stock.  Eliminating 
appraisal arbitrageurs furthers the Council’s position because it 
reinforces the legislative purpose section 262 was designed to uphold.188  
The Council’s policy rationale essentially states that there is no reason to 
eliminate appraisal arbitrage because dissenting shareholders are still 
protected.  This point dismisses the fact that appraisal arbitrage is 
causing substantial harm to the merger and acquisition community and 
simply ignores the root cause of the problem.  Eliminating appraisal 
arbitrage rectifies its negative impact on corporations while maintaining 
appraisal rights for the shareholders section 262 was designed to protect.  
Overall, the Council produced a policy rationale that overlooks the real 
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economic and policy reasons to limit appraisal arbitrage, and fails to see 
that elimination of appraisal arbitrage furthers the Council’s stated 
legislative policy. 
D. Amending Section 262 to Lower the Statutory Interest Rate 
Decreases the Leverage of Appraisal Arbitrageurs 
A second reform to substantially limit appraisal arbitrage includes 
lowering the statutory interest rate from 5% to 2.5% in excess of the 
Federal Reserve discount rate.  This reform will reduce the economic 
advantage of bringing an appraisal claim while continuing to protect the 
dissenting shareholders section 262 was designed to shelter.  As 
previously noted, the Delaware State Bar Association has approved 
minor reforms to allow for a company’s option to pay and limit the 
accrual of interest.189  While these proposed amendments provide some 
relief to corporations facing appraisal litigation, they fail to go far 
enough in actually limiting the actual appraisal actions with which 
corporations deal.  The amendments must lower the initial incentive for 
appraisal petitioners to bring a claim by lowering the statutory interest 
rate such petitioners will receive while their appraisal claim is pending. 
1. The Bar’s Appraisal Amendments Neglect a Viable Solution 
Section 262(h) provides an award of interest to appraisal petitioners 
equal to Delaware’s legal rate of interest (The Federal Reserve discount 
rate) plus 5%.190  This award is distributed to appraisal petitioners 
regardless of the overall outcome of the case and provides significant 
incentive to bring a claim.191  While the Bar’s Appraisal Amendments 
would provide some relief to corporations dealing with appraisal 
litigation, the Bar should have taken the further step of reducing the 
statutory interest rate amount in section 262(h). 
Reducing the statutory interest amount in section 262(h) provides a 
much simpler and effective solution because it eliminates the headache 
corporations must endure under the Delaware State Bar Association’s 
proposed amendments.  Under the Bar’s Appraisal Amendments, 
corporations may pay a cash amount to the dissenting shareholder before 
the appraisal proceeding ends, effectively limiting the accrual of 
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statutory interest during litigation.192  Scholars have concluded that this 
amendment may decrease the amount of unmeritorious appraisal claims 
and effectively reduce the amount of interest a corporation must pay 
appraisal petitioners.193  However, the amendment creates problems for 
corporations, which would not exist if the Bar simply reduced the overall 
interest rate in section 262(h). 
2. A Simple Solution May Restore the Intended Purpose of Statutory 
Interest 
The biggest issue statutory interest poses to merging corporations is 
the amount of interest that should be paid out during the appraisal 
proceeding.  The Bar’s Appraisal Amendments fail to include a “claw-
back mechanism” for a company to recoup any overpaid interest it 
provides to an appraisal litigant.194  Therefore, corporations must be 
careful not to overpay litigants because any excess payment would be 
presumably forfeited.195  In addition, corporations must take into 
consideration the strategic economic advantage of providing an upfront 
interest payment.196  It has been suggested that corporations may use the 
merger price as a guide to the upfront payment, but this is somewhat 
unreliable.197  While the merger price may be a reasonable guide, courts 
are sporadic in relying on the merger price to determine the appraised 
“fair value” of a transaction.198  Instead, Delaware courts typically rely 
on discounted cash flow and other appraisal methods to determine the 
fair value of the merger, which can produce an appraisal price that 
significantly differs, but is usually higher, than the merger price.199  
While the Bar’s Appraisal Amendments may provide a way for 
corporations to limit an appraisal petitioner’s statutory interest, the 
amendment leads to an unclear and unreliable evaluation for 
corporations. 
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In addition, the prepaying of interest before the close of appraisal 
litigation might lead to the encouragement of appraisal arbitrage.200  A 
corporation that provides a large upfront payment to appraisal petitioners 
before the close of litigation may encourage appraisal claims because 
paying appraisal claimants a large value upfront effectively supplies 
capital to claimants to fund their appraisal claims.201  If a corporation 
provides appraisal petitioners the opportunity to fund their claims, it 
effectively reduces the cost and risk of bringing an appraisal action and 
has the opposite effect the Bar’s Appraisal Amendments intend.202  
While the proposed amendments may seem to provide a way for 
corporations to take away the economic advantage appraisal petitioners 
find in the section 262(h) statutory interest rate, the amendment may 
work against merging corporations by funding the petitioners’ appraisal 
claim.  If the Bar’s Appraisal Amendments are altered to lower the 
statutory interest rate it stands to provide a simple solution to limiting the 
amount of appraisal arbitrage taking place. 
E. Using the Merger Price as a Factor to Determine “Fair Value” in 
Appraisal Decisions Gives Substance to a Fair Valuation 
As recent trends indicate, Delaware courts have recently settled on 
the merger price as a significant indicator of fair value in appraisal 
actions.  The court should be commended for their efforts to reaffirm the 
consideration of the merger price in their analysis of “all relevant 
factors” leading to the finding of a statutory fair value.203  Overall, this 
recent trend towards the use of the merger price is a step in the right 
direction when evaluating the fair value of a transaction subject to an 
appraisal proceeding. 
1. The Merger Price May be the Best Indication of Fair Value in 
Valuation Proceedings 
The Delaware court’s recent reliance on the merger price when 
determining “fair value” is a laudable effort because in a number of 
situations the merger price is the best indicator of fair value, and the 
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courts’ increased usage of this factor suggests that appraisal arbitrage 
should only be available when flawed deals undervalue companies.204  
The merger price is the best indicator of fair value when: (1) expert 
evaluations supplied by both sides of the appraisal action are considered 
particularly unreliable indications of value, and (2) when the sale process 
shows itself to be particularly reliable because the transaction was 
conducted at arms-length and with an effective market check.205  While 
some practitioners concluded that the decision in Golden Telecom 
discouraged the merger price as an indication of fair value, Delaware 
courts have put that assumption to rest in recent decisions indicating the 
merger price will be used when the facts of the transaction are 
appropriate.206 
2. Using The Merger Price in the “Fair Value” Evaluation is a Step in 
the Right Direction 
Court decisions utilizing the merger price as a relevant factor should 
be commended because they stand to further incentivize corporations to 
meet the arms-length and market check standards the court uses to 
initiate the merger price as fair value in an appraisal proceeding.  
Corporations now have additional incentive to avoid appraisal actions of 
dissenting shareholders by structuring their sales process to represent an 
arms-length merger with adequate market checks because the courts have 
stood firm in using this valuation method when appropriate.207  The 
recent trend reinforces the Delaware courts’ commitment to recognizing 
the merger price as fair value when—based on the facts of the 
transaction—a deal is conducted in a reasonable manner.  While the 
amendments proposed in this Comment attempt to spearhead the 
qualifications a shareholder must meet before it has the right to bring an 
appraisal claim, this recent trend of court decisions potentially limit 
appraisal arbitrage through a corporation’s use of self-help in statutory 
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appraisal proceedings regarding value.  This case law trend is a great 
incentive towards limiting appraisal arbitrage.  However, eliminating the 
purchase of shares after the record date and reducing the amount of 
statutory interest granted to appraisal petitioners provide the most 
efficient solutions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The practice of appraisal arbitrage is a growing issue that negatively 
affects the corporate landscape of mergers across the country.  The 
holdings of Transkaryotic and Ancestory.com have made it permissible 
for hedge funds and activist shareholders to purchase shares of a merging 
company after the record date.  This standard has created a conclusive 
economic advantage to parties that seek to purchase claims through 
appraisal arbitrage resulting in countless negative effects on companies 
engaging in a merger.  The courts have put the burden of fixing this 
valuable advantage on the Delaware legislature, which has yet to enact a 
reform to section 262 effectively ending appraisal arbitrage. 
The clear and most effective solution to eliminate or at least limit 
appraisal arbitrage is a two-pronged statutory reform that (1) eliminates 
the purchase of a merging corporation’s shares after the record date and 
(2) limits the statutory interest appraisal petitioners receive while an 
appraisal claim is decided.  These amendments will increase the risk of 
bringing an appraisal action by decreasing the amount of time appraisal 
arbitrageurs have to examine the financial landscape of a transaction.  In 
addition, this amendment will further the Delaware legislature’s policy 
by limiting section 262 to protect the dissenting shareholders it was 
initially designed to protect, while furthering a corporation’s incentive to 
reach a fair sales price.  The Delaware legislature can let appraisal 
arbitrage continue to affect corporations across the United States or it can 
effectively resolve the issue by enacting amendments to substantially 
limit appraisal arbitrage.  By eliminating the purchase of a merging 
corporation’s shares after the record date, and limiting the statutory 
interest appraisal petitioners receive, Delaware can revitalize section 262 
and ultimately close the floodgates on the practice of appraisal arbitrage. 
 
